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Introduction
General considerations
The process of designing adequate instruments
for implementing multifunctional forest man-
agement involves various stakeholders (state
or local administrations, environmentalists,
private forest owners etc) and recently it has
being enveloped into a broader policy-making
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process defined by the new concepts of safe
minimum standards, ecosystem services provi-
sion and trade-offs between conservation and
whatever economic benefits people might take
out from terrestrial ecosystems (Fisher et al.
2008). On the one hand, lots of reasons are
brought on the table for banning harvesting
operations wherever ecosystem services are
obvious; on the other hand harvesting the trees
is the most reliable way to secure the financial
sustainability of the forest enterprise. This
issue is quite important as the great expecta-
tions put into non-timber forest products seem
to be not so promising in terms of investments
(Kusters et al. 2006) and a tradeoff between
preserving natural forest as such and managing
them according to sustained yield principle
shall be sought in the European forest
economies, where both public and private
forests coexist. 
Although the sustained-yield principle has
been sometimes criticized in literature (Smith
1969, Struhsaker 1998) its realm has been
gradually broaden  (Wiersum 1995) and nowa-
days not the principle is debated, but its main
dimensions to follow: sustained yield of tim-
ber, or sustained provision of ecological serv-
ices (Bass 1993, Kennedy 1985). Romanian
forest policy is still hinged on this timber-yield
oriented principle, meaning the harvesting
decision still depends on age reached by each
even stand of trees, which actually reflects lit-
tle interest in grounding the managerial deci-
sion on the economic theory or social rules
(Kant 2000, Normandin 1995). 
According to the new Romanian Forest Act
(Anonymous 2008a), the forest owners shall
be compensated for the forgone revenues they
have to give up for sake of different environ-
mental considerations. The issue falls into the
broad category of compensations for ecosys-
tem services (Hackl et al. 2007), conceived as
means to render non-market values, the human
welfare relies on, into real financial incentives
for the ones who provide environmental serv-
ices (Engel et al. 2008, Fisher et al. 2008,
Fisher et al. 2009). Broadly speaking in this
category falls whatever action undertaken by
governments in order to increase the amount in
which ecosystem services are provided by
ecosystems managed by individual people or
local communities (Jack et al. 2008), although
the concept has been used to address the biodi-
versity conservation at international level
(Jones et Gardner 2008). 
Quite similar economic instruments have
been already implemented in some South and
Central American countries (Ballestero &
Rodriguez 2008, Boerner et al. 2007, Corbera
et al. 2009, de Koning et al. 2007) and Europe
(Anonymous 2008b) as additional means
needed to implement Natura 2000 Network.
Direct payments were embodied into an auc-
tion mechanism conceived to award the farm-
ers who provide ecological services (Klimek et
al. 2008). Other successful examples have
been analyzed in the context of a voluntary
program aiming at preserving the endangered
habitats through fixed-term agreement
between the governmental authority and the
forest owners who shall put off the decision of
harvesting the trees for a couple of years after
the age of 80, when regular stands are harvest-
ed (Mäntymaa et al. 2009). 
A quite similar approach, based on net rev-
enue from final logging was envisaged in order
to derive a statistical relationship between the
measure undertaken for environmental consid-
erations and the revenue the forest owner shall
give up in order to pursue ecological goals:
having a set of observable data consisting of
the two revenues (effective and forgone) and
the reasons for making these differences, a sta-
tistical relationship was conceived in order to
assess the compensation a forest owner shall
receive for taken measures for the sake of for-
est ecosystem (Carlén et al. 1999). In China, a
more integrated approach, assesses the oppor-
tunity cost of putting off harvesting operations
by incorporating the foregone revenue and the
Engel coefficient, used as a proxy of people
willingness to pay (Xiao-bo et al. 2005). In
Montana a price premium is being paid for
wool and meat produced by farmers who are
using non-lethal methods to protect the live-
stock (Badgley 2003); the author also quoted
the case of shade-grown coffee system, where
a price premium is also paid for the coffee pro-
duced in cultivated ecosystems resembling the
natural forests (coffee shrubs grow under a for-
est canopy, thus contributing to biodiversity
protection). 83
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The new Romanian Forest Act (Anonymous
2008a) highlights the importance of multifunc-
tional forest management both for public and
private forests. In order to secure sustainabili-
ty, forest health, biodiversity preservation and
flood control, the Forest Act suggests, in gen-
eral terms, some economic instruments able,
on the one hand, to collect money from the
ones who are the beneficiary of ecosystem
services and, on the other hand, to compensate
the private forest owners for the loss they
incurred due to these ecosystem services.
These challenges put the public authority
responsible for forests in a complex situation,
and the solution shall be sought in a thorough
analysis of both social and private opportunity
costs. Actually the public authority has to con-
template a tradeoff between the social cost of
not having enough protective forests, not hav-
ing enough money for the compensation sys-
tem and not having enough resources to moni-
tor and control whether or not the harvesting
restrictions are abided by the forest owners
who might have used both resources, wood
and compensations.
A snapshot on Romanian forest management
planning system
Two ruling principles are pursued by
Romanian forest management: the sustained
yield principle, which states the allowable cut
shall be even for the next 60 years (Sandulescu
et al. 2007) and the territorial principle,
according to which a forest management plan
shall be produced for each production unit.
According to this principle, all forest patches
located in the same forestshed form a produc-
tion unit, irrespective to the ownership pattern.
The size of a production unit may vary
between some hundreds hectare (in plain
region) to 4-5 thousands hectare (in mountain-
ous region); each production unit can be split
into two or more subunits, each of them being
more or less specialized on providing a given
timber grade or a bunch of environmental serv-
ices like flood prevention, soil protection,
amenities and biodiversity preservation.
Where the stands are managed mainly for tim-
ber production an allowable cut is set up using
two different methods: the indicative growth
method and the age-class method, each method
being a sort of back-up for the other one; in
most situations, the allowable cut assessed by
the indicative growth method is accepted
because this method, which will be further pre-
sented, is more consistent and relies on some
input parameters easy to figure out. The allow-
able cut depends on the average annual yield
harvestable in the next 10, 20, 40 and 60 years,
each yield depending on the age class structure
and the total forest area. All these harvestable
volumes covering a period of 60 years are
merged into a synthetic parameter, Q, which
actually indicates the extent to which the grow-
ing stock is normal (Q = 1) is dominated by old
stands (Q > 1), or, on the contrary, by younger
stands, when Q < 1 (see, for more details, the
Annex).  
As the strictly protected forests are excepted
from regular harvesting operations, it’s obvi-
ous that withdrawing any patch of forest from
timber production will diminish the potential
allowable cut of the whole production unit, and
this is the main input for assessing the oppor-
tunity cost of having protective forests instead
on regular timber production forests. 
In the last two decades the Romanian
forestry has been implementing a gradually
process of forest restitution which has resulted
in a mixed ownership structure (figure 1),
close to the one existing before the forest
nationalization took place in 1948.  
After the year of 2000 many forests have
been restituted to the local communities irre-
Figure 1 The pattern of Romanian forest fund 
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spective to their internal functional zoning and
a compensation system had to be conceived in
order to avoid any conflict between forest
owners and the public authority responsible for
forestry (Strimbu et al. 2005). In 2006 the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural
Development issued the Ministerial Order no.
625 to compensate the individual forest own-
ers for the revenues they have to give up when-
ever a strictly protected area has been delineat-
ed on within the forest they own. The method-
ology implemented through this order was
pretty simple, and the compensation was equal
to the value of the average growth at maturity
age for the main species found on each individ-
ual property. Such an approach shan’t be able
to make an adequate difference between two
neighbors owning similar forests, one being
managed for timber production and the latter
for protection only and therefore an additional
study was needed in order to better differenti-
ate the likely situations. 
The baseline of designing the compensation
scheme for the forest owners is the opportuni-
ty cost of obeying the functional zoning. In
economic terms, such an opportunity cost is
the amount of money a forest owner gives up
for producing more positive externalities than
the average amount of positive externalities
provided by a forest designated for timber pro-
duction. This provision is necessary because,
according to the Romanian forest management
system, what makes the difference between a
protective forest and a commercial one is not
the maturity age, but the officially accepted
reason for cutting the trees: while commercial
forests once they have reached the maturity
age are harvested for being regenerated, and an
allowable cut is set up for each forest, when it
comes to strictly protected forests there is no
allowable cut, meaning that only dead trees
can be harvested. 
Nevertheless such a scheme shall be able to
cope with most of the situation when a com-
pensation is needed but, at the same time, it
shall be enough simple to make the difference
both for the authority and the forest owner who
are contemplating three sets of decisions: to
pay or not to pay, to accept or not the compen-
sation scheme and the forest functional zoning.
Aim of study
The goal of this study is to conceive a formu-
la-based compensation scheme tailored to the
existing forest management planning system
able to account for the most important signal
given by the local market, which is wood-by-
stem market price. Having a formula-based
compensation scheme, it will be possible to
better tune up the appropriate compensation
that shall be paid for each hectare of forest
withdrawn from the timber production, and, as
shown further, this average compensation will
be differentiated according to the hauling dis-
tance, which actually increases or decreases
the timber market price. Having done this dif-
ferentiation, the public authority will pay more
for the patches of protective forests located
nearby the forest roads and less for the
remotest, which really makes sense for the
decision made by the forest owners, to accept
or not the functional zoning constraints, having
to contemplate different opportunity costs for
the two extreme situations, i.e. timber produc-
tion or strictly protected forest area. 
Materials and method
Initiating the process of functional zoning
from scratch, the “default” destination of forest
is timber production, the age structure would
be S and the allowable cut would be A(Q(S)).
Withdrawing from timber production a forest
patch, assumed to produce only environmental
services, the age structure of the remaining for-
est meant to produce timber would change and,
consequently, the Q parameter and the allow-
able cut. This economic effect of changing the
ratio between the productive and protective
forests was further used to hypothesize what
can be considered a sort of “crisp” average
opportunity cost of forest zoning, which actu-
ally is the long-term effect of shrinking the
production forests due to whatever reason
(biodiversity conservation, soil and water pro-
tection and so forth).  
Having the age structure and the volume dis-
tribution against these age structure for the
strictly protective stands, is further possible to
assess to which extent these stands would have
change the allowable cut unless they hadn’t85
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been withdrawn from the timber production.
The same approach can be refined with the
same software used for producing the forest
management plans, but it would be more diffi-
cult to run twice this computer program: once
with the “true” information referring the strict-
ly protected stands, and secondly with
“altered” information as if these stands weren’t
protected. This effort doesn’t pay off because
the difference between the two allowable cuts
is just a piece of the puzzle called opportunity
cost of forest functional zoning. The other
pieces are equally important and it would be
more helpful to allocate some effort to address
other issues, like the extent to which people
would be willing to accept to be compensated,
which implies a sound local experience in par-
ticipatory management (Mäntymaa et al.
2009). 
Roughly speaking, the per year-and-hectare
compensation (C) worth being paid to the for-
est owner is given by equation 
(1)
where V* is the allowable ent the production
unit would have had without having harvesting
constraints, V is the actual allowable cut, P is
the average price fetched on the local market
by wood-by-stem and Sp is the forest area
withdrawn from the timber production for con-
servation purpose (strictly protected area). 
This average compensation per hectare and
year shall be further differentiated on hauling
distances to account for the differences
brought by the cost of harvesting operations.
The Romanian stumpage pricing system refers
to five classes of hauling distances1; hence the
average compensation can be broken down
into five distance-dependent compensations,
according to relation (2), where ci stands for
the per-year compensation paid for one hectare
of forest that falls into the I category of haul-
ing distance. 
(2)
where
The only new variables are si - the protected
forest area that falls into the i-th category of
hauling distance and qi, which is timber price
differential corresponding to the i-th category
of hauling distances. These coefficients are
accounting for the differences between the
average hauling distances and they have been
used for setting up the seller’s reservation
price; their values are presented in table 1 and
they have been undertaken from the National
Forest Administration timber pricing system. 
The difference between the two allowable
cuts is difficult to calculate because it implies
two different and independent runs of the spe-
cialized software used to produce the whole
forest management plan. Although it seams a
quite easy task, in fact it is not easy at all,
because for each stand included in the strictly
protected sub-unit the planner shall recom-
mend hypothetical silvicultural systems as if
that stand would not have been withdrawn
from timber production; in other words, alter-
native technical solutions shall be conceived
although they are just hypothetical. Hence a
statistical approach was conceived and the first
step in this direction was to divide both terms
of equation (1) to P, thus resulting on the left
side the ratio between the compensation and
timber price, while on the right side we have
only volumes divided by the strictly protected
area. Since both V* and V eventually depend
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Table 1 Price differentials used to break down the 
average compensation on hauling distances
Hauling distance (m)  Timber price differential (qi)
< 250  6.0 
251-500  5.5 
500-1000  5.0 
1001-1500  4.5 
>1500  3.5 
1 Less than 250 m, 251-500 m, 501-1000 m, 1001-1500 m and more than 1500 m hauling distances, measured on the map according to
the natural course of hauling operations. Ann. For. Res. 53(1), 2010   Research papers
86 86
on the age structure of the two sub-units (wood
production and conservation), a reliable statis-
tical dependency between the compensation/
price ratio and the forest fund main indicators
was sought, as follows. 
In equation (1) the only unknown variable is
the allowable cut without functional zoning,
V*. Mathematically, this hypothetical allow-
able cut depends on the variables presented in
the bottom row of Table  2 and the fist column
of Table 3. 
These data were produced by the forest man-
agement planning software for each produc-
tion unit. Without having the harvesting ban
brought about by protection goals - whatever
these goals are - all input data needed for com-
puting the allowable cut would have changed,
as shown in the 4th column of table 3. In the
case study presented in these two tables, the
new indicative growth accounts for a larger
forest area, i.e. 1890.5 ha (845 ha timber pro-
duction sub-unit, plus the protective forests
accounting for 1045.5 ha) while the volumes
that wound have been harvestable in the next
10, 20, 40 and 60 years would be larger, the
difference being given by volumes recorded,
on the bottom line of Table 2.
Since these volumes are known for both sub-
units - the one managed for timber production
and the one managed for conservation  - it is
possible to assess this parameter for any oper-
ational forest management plan included in the
studied sample; accordingly, as many as 96
production units were randomly selected more
than 40 forest districts providing the presence
of one subunit where no allowable cut is
allowed (Figure 2). The number of analyzed
production units in each forest district varies
from one to five.
The calculation went on according to the for-
mulae and conditions presented in the Annex;
the output is a hypothetical allowable cut
allowing for assessing the compensation worth
being paid. For all production units included in
the sample the same algorithm was used and
the next step was to figure out the most accu-
rate regression function relating the compensa-
tion/price ratio to all significant variables that
refers to the structure of the production unit as
a whole. The volumes (Vd, V1, V2 and V3)
recorded in the 3rd column of table 3 were
summed up as follows: (i) At the initial Vd,
half of the 5th age class volume is  being added
being added, along with the cumulative vol-
ume of the last two age classes (6th and 7th );
(ii) V1, which refers to the stands harvestable
in the next 20 years, summed up the volumes
of all last three age classes, in addition to the
initial value, recorded in 3rd column; (iii) V2,
which refers to the stands harvestable in the
next 40 years, summed up the last four age
classes to the initial value and the same rule
applies for the V3. 
The average compensation shall be further
broken down according to the five categories of
hauling distances taking into account the haul-
ing distance distribution as shown in Table 4.
This differentiation was done according to
relation (2), considering the coefficients pre-
sented in Table 1 and the distribution of the
forest area on hauling distances as presented in
Table 2 Age structure of the protective sub-unit and potential harvestable volumes that would have altered
the allowable cut of the whole production unit (Vatra Dornei Forest District, 1st Production Unit)
Variables  Total  Ages class 
           I         II         III     IV     V        VI        VII 
Area (ha)  1045.5  26.7 34.7 20.9 428.6 513.3 12.2 9.1
Volum (m
3)    1346.0 5330.0 7651.0 191469.0 223494.0 5604.0 3762.0
 
Figure 2 Location of forest districts where input 
data where collected from 87
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column 2.   
Having a quite representative data sample,
extracted from 96 forest management plans, as
many as 96 new hypothetical allowable cuts
were calculated as shown in Table 2 and Table
3. Further, using relations (1) and (2), the com-
pensations were calculated and then differenti-
ated using the coefficients presented in Table 1
and the distribution of strictly protected forests
against haling distance. 
Screening the input data, a significant corre-
lations between the Q coefficient for the timber
production subunit and the hypothetical new Q
for the whole production unit was found; so,
the actual Q is a good proxy for the extent to
which the protection unit is or it is not rich in
old stands that would have been harvestable.
Having these 96 theoretical compensations
worth being paid, the average price fetched by
the timber in each production unit, and all oth-
ers input data a multiple linear regression was
conceived, considering the ratio between com-
pensation and the price as regressand.
Results
The data presented in Table 5 suggest that most
significant variables would be Q, St and Sp,
because they are not inter-correlated but
strongly correlated with other variable not
taken into account (CI, VD, V1...V3); keeping
only these variables of the empirical model,
the multicolinearity is avoided and the final
statistical inference is being simplified. 
The outcome of the statistic data processing
is presented in Table 6. Some possible changes
for area variables were tried in order to figure
out the most accurate statistical model; this
explains why the two areas were merged into
the natural logarithm of the ration between the
total forest area and the square root of the
strictly protected forest area. 
Then the regression function presented in
Table 6 was rendered into (3), which has been
further used to assess the average compensa-
tion per year and hectare.
(3)
Having this average compensation per year
and hectare it is further possible to break it
down according to the five hauling distance
categories, into the five different values,
accounting for the residual value differences
brought about by hauling operations. 
Table 3 Input data for re-computing the allowable
cut as if no protective sub-unit would 
have been created (Vatra Dornei forest 
District, 1st Production Unit)
Variables  Units 
 
Actual 
values 
Values 
without 
harvesting 
constraints 
Indicative 
Growth 
m
3  4,382  7,803 
Vd  m
3  16,738  137,851 
V1  m
3  246,025  367,138 
V2  m
3  376,012  608,872 
V3  m
3  399,444  823,773 
D1  m
3  -54,164  119,642 
D2  m
3  158,385  211,078 
D3  m
3  200,732  296,752 
D4  m
3  136,524  355,593 
Dm  m
3  -54,164  119,642 
Q    0.3  1.767 
m      1.134 
Rotation  Years  110  110 
Vd/10  m
3/year  1,673  13,785 
V1/20  m
3/year  12,301  18,357 
V2/40  m
3/year  9,400  15,222 
V3/60  m
3/year  6,657  13,730 
A  m
3/year  1,673  8,850 
Area managed for timber production 
(ha) St 
845 
Protected area (ha) Sp  1045.5 
Wood-by-
stem price 
lei/ m
3  90   
Compensa-
tion 
lei/year/
ha 
618   
Table 4 Compensation per year and hectare for 
Vatra Dornei For est District (1st produc-
tion unit), differentiated on hauling distances 
Hauling 
distance  
category 
Area under 
harvesting 
ban (ha) 
Compensation 
(lei/year/ha) 
<250  42.0  772.754 
251-500  284.0  708.358 
501-1000  243.0  643.962 
1001-500  320.0  579.566 
>1501  476.5  450.773 
Total  1365.5   
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Model validation
The two methods were tested on the same data
sample, which covers 7560 hectares, randomly
selected from another set of production units,
that have not been used for statistical analysis,
and two type of compensations were comput-
ed: one set using the methodology embodied in
the Ministerial Order no. 625 and another one
using the methodology based on equations  and
the results are summarized in Table 7. 
As presented in Table 7, on the average, the
compensation worth being paid per year and
hectare seems to be a little smaller than the
compensation calculated through the average
growth method. Nevertheless the proposed
method allows for a more logical differentia-
tion on haling distances, which really makes
sense in a real economy where people are con-
templating not the “official” prices, but the
prices fetched by the timber sold on a free mar-
ket. This issue will be discussed in the next
session.
Discussion and conclusion
More or less this research falls into the broad
category of studies focused on appraising the
ecosystem services produced by forests
(Alexander et al. 1998, Lewandrowski et al.
1999, Mäntymaa et al. 2009, Xiao-bo et al.
2005). In this respect a very comprehensive lit-
erature is at hand (Hoehn 2006, Villa et al.
2002) but this study was strictly focused on
finding an appropriate and simple economic
instrument able to stimulate the forest owners
to obey the managerial provisions of banning
the harvesting operations. The corresponding
economic instrument needed to finance these
compensations is, ultimately, a local or a
national tax for environmental services.
Dimensioning this tax needs a thorough analy-
sis of people willingness-to-pay, and prior to
that, a consistent awareness campaign. The
existing situation, when these compensations
are being paid from the budget of the public
authority responsible for forestry is not a sus-
tainable one and, probably, the best option
would be the already existing environmental
fund, which is fed on regular basis from all
kind of economic activities, including harvest-
Table 5 Matrix of correlation coefficients and their statistical significance for the regressors used to assess
the ratio compensation/price (96 cases) Signification level (s): *, s >95%; **, s > 99%; n.s., non 
significant
Variables  CI  VD  V1  V2  V3  Q  St  Sp 
CI  1  0.690**  0.755**  0.505**  0.876**  0.004  0.938**  0.196 
VD    1  0.929**  0.473**  0.690**  0.393**  0.697**  0.086 
V1      1  0.563**  0.822**  0.405**  0.759**  0.088 
V2        1  0.627**  0.217*  0.456**  0.038 
V3          1  0.207*  0.828**  0.076 
Q            1  0.041  -0.048 
St              1  0.170 
 
Table 6 Multiple regression function having the ration compensation/price as regressand
Regression coefficients  Standardized coefficients 
(Beta) 
T test 
 
p (%) 
 
Regressor 
 
  B  Standard error       
Q  1.428  0.377  0.315  3.785  0.000 
ln
SS p t
Sp
+
 
0.663  0.093  0.595  7.150  0.000 
 89
Drãgoi  Compensating the opportunity cost of forest functional zoning ...
ing operations. 
This goal of encouraging forest owner to
accept and obey the harvesting bans cannot be
reached without having a good sense of the
real opportunity cost a forest owner contem-
plates whenever s/he has to decide to go for
compensation or for regular harvesting opera-
tions. The method proposed in this article
relies on two pillars of the existing Romanian
forest management system: the former is the
method used to calculate the allowable cut and
the latter is the algorithm used to calculate the
timber price. Both inputs, the amount of har-
vestable wood (allowable cut) and its corre-
sponding price turn into a given overall value;
dividing that total value to the total area
wherein harvesting operations are prohibited,
an average compensation per hectare, worth
being paid, is finally estimated. Doing so, the
whole compensation system depends on the
amount of wood both protective and produc-
tive forests can give in a certain area, not on
what the forest owners expect from a normal
forest, as the method proposed by the public
authority has done. 
From the technical point of view, the amount
of timber to be compensated for2 depends on
three inputs: the total area of the forest (St), the
area of protected forest (Sp) and the indicator
(Q) that shows to which extent the age class
structure of the productive forest is balanced or
not, and which type of stands (older or younger
than 60 years) dominates the forest3. Entering
this indicator into the statistical relationship
makes the difference between young forests,
where the allowable cut would have been the
same, with or without protective stands, and
mature forests, where a patch of protective
stands seriously diminished the would-be
allowable cut for the whole forest. The under-
line assumption is that protective forests are
more protective the older they are, which real-
ly makes sense from all points of view.  
Making this reference to overall indicators
of the forest structure is consistent with the
provisions of the Forest Code, which says that
a distinct managerial plan shall be produced
for each productive unit (UP), irrespective to
the ownership structure of that forest area,
meaning that the allowable cut shall not be set
up for each ownership. What really matters for
the individual forest owner is not the total
allowable cut, but the volume s/he is allowed
to harvest in the next ten years from her/his
forest. If none of her/his neighbors is allowed
to cut, due to the age structure of the whole
forest, s/he has no reason to ask for being com-
pensated; for all forest owners only the tax
relief shall apply, according to Art. 137 of the
Forest Code (Anonymous 2008a). Somehow
the method proposed here is very penurious: it
doesn’t compensate any environmental serv-
ice, unless a real loss is being produced instead
of that service (see the comparison presented
in Table 7). 
From the economic point of view, this
approach could be more effective than a flat-
rate compensation used in developed countries
for two reasons at least: (i) Those who have
“protected forests” located nearby the forest
Table 7 Comparative analysis of the two methods used to figure out the compensation
Main statistics and 
methods 
Average 
compensation 
(lei/year/ 
hectare) 
Total  
compensation to be 
paid for the sample 
area (lei) 
The highest/the 
lowest 
compensation 
lei/year/ hectare) 
Standard 
deviation on the 
whole sample 
(lei/year/ hectare) 
Average growth 
method  Ministerial 
Order 625) 
578  4,369,680  1206/444   253 
Formulae-based 
method 
465  3,515,400  1579/20  1269 
 
2 This amount is within the brackets of the 3rd formula.   
3 Q<1 means that young stands prevail; Q=1 denotes a balanced structure for the productive forests; Q>1, denotes that older stands
prevail in the forest structure.Ann. For. Res. 53(1), 2010   Research papers
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road will receive a higher compensation,
accounting for the rent differentials brought
out by lower harvesting costs; being better
paid, statistically it is more likely for them to
observe the managerial plan provisions
because they get a comparable income as if
they were allowed to harvest. (ii) Those,
whose forests are quite remote, will get a
smaller compensation, because their opportu-
nity cost is lesser too. It doesn’t mean that
“environmental services” are undervalued, but
the same rationale apply: as long as the forest
owner compares two equal revenues, s/he will
prefer the most certain one, which is the com-
pensation.  
The two situations described above can be
re-word as follows: “the forest nearby the for-
est road deserve more money for being pro-
tected” while “distant forest are already some-
how protected by higher harvesting costs, and
the state shall pay only the difference to the
opportunty cost of preserving them”. 
From the social and ecological point of view,
the method might have positive side-effects
because it doesn’t produce any bias in the deci-
sion making process: all parties involved in
drafting the management plan have to think
not over the outcome of functional zoning, but
over the rationale behind that functional zon-
ing: what’s worth being protected and what is
not. 
Like the alternative option, drafted by public
authority, the average compensation shall be
updated each year, taking into account the tim-
ber market price, which the best proxy of the
forgone revenue. In contrast to that method,
where the hauling distance doesn’t matter, dif-
ferentiating the compensation on hauling dis-
tances allows a better allocation of the money,
since the compensation is higher for accessible
stands and lower for the remote ones, which
really makes sense for the forest owners who
might be tempted to harvest the trees; getting a
higher compensation, these forest owners,
when they really need timber, they might buy
some from the market. If they need just money,
it’s more convenient for them to get that
money from the state instead of harvesting and
selling the wood. 
For the public authority, that is the Forest
Inspectorates who are in charged with imple-
menting the whole system, it would be more
convenient to handle an economic instruments
that provides effective incentives for the forest
owners to obey the managerial plans, instead
of giving flat-rate compensations for a large
areas, where some forest owners might not be
compensated enough, while others might be
overcompensated. 
Nevertheless, the method presented in this
study shall be endorsed by a socio-economic
survey on some very important protected areas
in order to assess the gap between what can be
effectively paid by the public authority and
really can be accepted as compensation by the
forest owners. Without this tuning-up the
whole system might be unproductive: the state
might have some money for these compensa-
tions but this money cannot be used because
most of the forest owners were not content
with the compensations they would have
received. This is one possible blockage; the
other blockage, brought about by the econom-
ic crisis, could be the financial resources these
compensations shall be paid from. In both sit-
uation, a thorough analysis of private forest
functional zoning is needed, in order to identi-
fy those issues which are really important and
make the difference between a real sustainable
forest management and a counterfeit sustain-
ability. 
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Appendix
According to the indicative growth method,
the allowable cut (A) is given by A=m.Ci
where  m is  a altering factor and Ci is the
indicative growth, meant as the current growth
of growing stock resembling the real one in
terms of composition and density but equally
distributed against age classes. The altering
factor m is given by another equation m = a +
bQ where the regression coefficients a and b
depends on the rotation, according to the data
presented in the table below, when Q > 1.
Q is a key variable in all these computations
and it is given by 
where  Dm is the minimum value of the
following array:
where Vd, V1, V2 and V3 stand for the amount
of timber harvestable in the next 10, 20, 40 and
60 years, according to the present situation of
age distribution, and health condition of stands
that will be mature in the next decades. 
If Q < 1, the calculation goes on another path,
meaning that A, the allowable cut, will equal to
the lowest value of the following ratios: 
If one term of these ratios are smaller than
one, then the following formula will apply 
where ζ is the smallest ratio of 
and  ∆ iv  is the difference between the total
growth for the next 10 years and the growth of
the main yield corresponding to the same peri-
od; actually this difference accounts for half of
the growth expected in the next decade. 
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Coeffi-  Rotation (years) 
cient  80  90  100  110  120  130  140  150  160 
a  0.651  0.756  0.825  0.867  0.895  0.916  0.931  0.942  0.951 
b  0.349  0.244  0.175  0.133  0.105  0.084  0.069  0.058  0.049 
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